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I. INTRODUCTION
Few could argue that the past few decades witnessed increased
attention given to the environment and its associated problems. From the
publication of Silent Spring' in 1962, to the various international
conferences addressing sustainable development, ozone depletion, and
climate change, and to the large volume of media coverage surrounding
environmental catastrophes including oil spills and nuclear accidents,
public awareness of environmental problems assuredly is increasing.2
This heightened awareness increases demands for solutions to these
problems.3 Initially, proposed solutions were primarily "end-of-pipe"
dealing with the problems after pollution already occurred. In contrast,
recent years demonstrate a movement towards proactive measures,
focusing on the source of the problem rather than providing reactive,
expensive end-of-pipe solutions!
Eco-labeling, or environmental labeling, provides one example of a
proactive solution to environmental problems. Simply stated, eco-labels
are, "seals placed on a product or package which identify those con-
sumer products determined to be environmentally less harmful than
other functionally and competitively similar products. 6 Generally, they
attempt to promote environmentally safe behavior by using market
mechanisms instead of outright government bans.7
1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Many link the modern environmental
movement with the publication of this book. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 257 (2000); ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 81-86 (1993).
2. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), ENVI-
RONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 11 (1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES].
3. Id.
4. Id.; Surya P. Subedi, Balancing International Trade with Environmental Protection:
International Legal Aspects of Eco-Labelling, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 373, 373 (1999).
5. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 11.
6. Jim Salzman, The Trade Implications of Trends in Eco-Labeling, in LIFE-CYCLE
MANAGEMENT AND TRADE 41, 42 (OECD ed., 1994).
7. See ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 12-13;
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continu-
ing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 294 (1997).
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Despite appearing as a benign tool to protect the environment, the
legality of eco-labels under the free trade regime of the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") is questionable.8 The debate centers on whether
specific labeling regimes, such as those focused on the labeling of prod-
ucts produced with or containing genetically modified organisms
("GMOs"), act as either a de jure or de facto barrier to trade9 in violation
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO
Agreement").' °
Around October 1998, the European Community ("EC") imple-
mented a moratorium on approving products produced with or
containing GMOs. Subsequently, on May 13, 2003, Argentina, Canada
and the United States requested consultations with the EC under the dis-
pute settlement provisions of the WTO." These consultations proved
fruitless, and on August 8, 2003, the three countries requested the estab-
lishment of a panel to evaluate the dispute and make recommendations
to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").'2 On October 18, 2003,
the EC independently decided to publish new regulations governing the
labeling and traceability of GMOs. 13 While the moratorium remains,
there are indications that it will end, allowing the importation of GM
8. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 33.
9. Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environ-
mental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205,
233 (1996).
10. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
11. European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Bio-
tech Products, Request for Consultations by Argentina, May 21, 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/DS293/I; European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for Consultations by Canada, May 20, 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/DS292/1; European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for Consultations by the United States, May 20, 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/DS291/1. All WTO documents are available via the WTO website, at http://
www.wto.org/.
12. European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Bio-
tech Products, Request for Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, Aug. 8, 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/DS293/17; European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for Establishment of a Panel by Canada, Aug. 8, 2003, WTO Doc.
WT/DS292/17; European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Aug. 8, 2003,
WTO Doc. WT/DS291/23 [hereinafter U.S. Panel Request];
13. Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of 22 September
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 [hereinafter Food and
Feed]; Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of 22 September 2003
Concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Trace-
ability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms and
Amending Directive 2001/18/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24 [hereinafter Traceability and Label-
ling].
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foods. 4 If the EC lifts the moratorium and applies the strict requirements
of the new regulations, then the dispute will probably continue, with the
three complaining countries contesting the legality of the regulations
under WTO trade rules.
15
This Note explores the compatibility of the EC's GMO regulations
within the framework of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"),' 6 the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"),'7 and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994" or "GAT"),'8 all
integral parts of the WTO Agreement. Part II presents arguments for or
against the use of GM-products. Part III explores the concept of eco-
labeling by analyzing the general goals of such programs, including the
economic theory behind green consumerism and the characteristics nec-
essary for effective schemes. Part IV describes the core objectives and
features of the EC regulations. To provide a framework for analyzing the
EC regulations under the WTO regime, Part V sorts eco-labeling
schemes into different categories. Part VI examines the legality of the
EC's regulations under the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement and
GATT 1994. Finally, Part VII presents a proposal for a trade-sensitive
regime. This Note illustrates that the EC regulations run afoul of several
WTO provisions, but argues that it is possible to develop an eco-labeling
program to assuage consumer concerns over GMOs without violating
WTO Agreement and without the need to resort to a new watered-down
treaty.
14. John Mason, EU May End GM Food Imports Delay, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at
11; Shelley Emling, U.S. European Union toe-to-toe Over Trade Issues, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Nov. 2, 2003, at ID.
15. It is important to clarify that the current W7O dispute focuses on the defacto mora-
torium and not the EC's regulatory framework for GMO-labeling, discussed in Part. IV, infra.
This Note focuses on these labeling regulations as a source of continuing debate within the
WTO over the regulation of GMOs.
16. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 10, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, at 69, 33 I.L.M. at 21893 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
17. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 10, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, at
22051 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
18. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, WTO Agreement,
supra note 10, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1,
33 I.L.M. 29 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. GATf 1994 includes the provisions of the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], as well as vari-
ous protocols, decisions, and understandings promulgated under the 1947 treaty.
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II. GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS:
HELPFUL OR HARMFUL?
Disputes over government regulations, whether domestic or interna-
tional, focus in part on the perceived effects of GMOs. Opponents of
GMOs point to numerous threats that warrant containing or banning the
use GMOs. The threshold concern is the uncertain effects following the
genetic alteration of a living organism.' 9 The potential harm associated
with human consumption 0 and the unknown effects of introducing a for-
eign organism into a given ecosystem is immeasurable.2 ' In addition to
this scientific uncertainty are ethical and religious beliefs that question
the morality of humans playing the role of God.2
On the other hand, proponents view GMOs as replete with eco-
nomic, environmental, and health benefits. Economically, transferring
favorable characteristics into crop seeds can increase per acre food pro-
duction, providing food for a growing world population while reducing
pesticide use.23 Environmentally, GMOs may be able to fend of decreas-
ing biodiversity by replenishing scarce resources. 24 Additionally,
scientists can alter crops to improve the nutritional components of food.
These potential benefits ensure the continued proliferation of GM
products. Nonetheless, the potential negative effects of GMOs necessi-
tate proactive measures to resolve any problems that arise. Such
measures should provide consumers with the option of avoiding these
risks by avoiding GMOs while comporting with international trade law.
III. GOALS OF EcO-LABELING: GREEN CONSUMERISM
A. Theory Behind Eco-Labeling
Economic laws of supply and demand provide the basis for green
consumerism. Proponents of green consumerism argue that society can
protect the environment by developing a market for environmentally safe
19. Darren Smits & Sean Zaboroski, GMO's: Chumps of Champs of International
Trade?, I ASPER REV. INT'L Bus & TRADE L. 111, 114 (2001).
20. Charles W. Smitherman III, Comment, World Trade Organization Adjudication of
the European Union-United States Dispute Over the Moratorium on the Introduction of New
Genetically Modified Foods to the European Common Market: A Hypothetical Opinion of the
Dispute Panel, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 475,482 (2002).
21. Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 19, at 114 (noting that the introduction of GMOs
has the potential to reduce biodiversity).
22. Id.; Smitherman, supra note 20, at 482.
23. See Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 19, at 114; Smitherman, supra note 20, at 480.
24. Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 19, at 113.
25. Id.; Smitherman, supra note 20, at 481.
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products.26 To this end, this Note assumes that advocates of labeling re-
gimes that identify GM-products view GMOs as environmentally unsafe
and that the presence of a label will cause an increase in demand for
non-GM products with a corresponding decrease in demand for GM-
products.27 In effect, these proponents hope to establish a virtuous cycle
that will raise consumer awareness and stimulate demand while increas-
ing product sales for non-GMO producers.
The first step in this cycle, raising consumer awareness, includes in-
forming customers "that their purchases do effect the environment, and
that some products are worse for the environment than others. 28 Inherent
in this is teaching consumers the cumulative effects of environmentally
harmful practices. 29 Additionally, "[i]f consumers are not aware of the
existence of the label or do not understand what it signifies, the program
cannot achieve [its goals of stimulating demand and increasing sales.]" 0
Specifically, eco-labels raise awareness by "inform[ing] the con-
sumer about the effect of the product, or its process of production, on the
environment."3' Consumers need information on how a product harms
the environment before, during, and after a product's useful life.32 Thus,
labels are "supposed to assist consumers [in] making informed pur-
chases, 33 by allowing them to compare similarly functional products,
"provid[ing] ... another basis of product choice beyond price, perform-
ance, and other attributes."
Providing an enhanced level of information pushes the next step in
the cycle by altering consumer behavior to "create demand pressures in
favor of environmentally friendly products. 35 Once a consumer realizes
the relative impact of a given product, he will hopefully purchase a less
environmentally harmful product. 36 A derived use of the fuel economy
guides regulated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
26. JULIAN MORRIS, GREEN GOODS? CONSUMERS, PRODUCT LABELS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 13-14 (1997).
27. This Note considers non-GM products to be "green," as compared with products
produced from or containing GMOs.
28. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 13.
29. See id.
30. Avi Gesser, Comment, Canada's Environmental Choice Program: A Model for a
"Trade-Friendly" Eco-Labeling Scheme, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 504 (1998).
31. Christian Tietje, Voluntary Eco-Labeling Programmes and Questions of State Re-
sponsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 123, 126.
32. See infra Part. ILI.B for a discussion of the "cradle-to-grave" feature of eco-labels.
33. David Robertson, GM Foods and Global Trade, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 206, 215 (David Robertson & Aynsley Kellow eds., 2001).
34. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 12.
35. Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. Rev 599, 601 (1999).
36. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 12.
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("EPA") and the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") provides
a real-world example of this cycle.37 A consumer looking to purchase a
new car can compare relative fuel economy though the use of miles-per-
gallon estimates, which dealerships display on showroom cars." While a
customer might decide to purchase a more fuel-efficient car out of long-
term cost concerns, these labels arguably have the effect of encouraging
the consumer to purchase a car that consumes relatively less fuel, a clear
goal of environmentalists. Thus, there is de facto discrimination against
less-efficient cars.
Increasing consumer demand in turn "provide[s] incentives for pro-
ducers to produce environmentally friendly products to gain a larger
market share., 39 These incentives act as the proverbial carrot,4° since the
presence of a label should increase the sales of these products.4' Manu-
facturers seeking to apply for an eco-label that uses some form of life-
cycle assessment will exert downward pressure on their suppliers. 42 It is
likely that moral and ethical concerns will not drive manufacturers to
produce green goods. Indeed, the potential competitive advantage gained
by being able to affix an eco-label to their product often motivates manu-
facturers to apply for a label 3
If producers are able to capture the economic gains from a market
for green goods, then they will seek to increase the size of the green
market." Green producers will intensify their advertising efforts while
producing a larger variety of green products, including non-GM goods.
Thus, producers will also seek to educate consumers, restarting the vir-
tuous cycle.
While the positive effects of labeling are debatable, many recognize
the usefulness of such programs. For example, trade and environment
scholar Daniel C. Etsy argues that, "[1]abeling can. . . be a powerful tool
for environmental policy advances."' Additionally, Agenda 21 and
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
("Rio Declaration"), both adopted at the United Nations Conference on
37. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEW-
ABLE ENERGY & U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FUEL ECONOMY GUIDE (2004),
available at http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/FEG2004.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2003).
38. Id.
39. Okubo, supra note 35, at 601.
40. ARTHUR E. APPLETON, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMMES: INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAW IMPLICATIONS 13-14 (1997).
41. See Salzman, supra note 6, at 43; Tietje, supra note 31, at 126.
42. MORRIS, supra note 26, at 30.
43. See OECD, EcO-LABELLING: ACTUAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED PROGRAMMES 68
(OECD, Working Paper No. 44, vol. V, 1997) [hereinafter OECD, EcO-LABELLING].
44. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 12.
45. Daniel C. Etsy, Unpacking the "Trade and Environment" Conflict, 25 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1259, 1285 (1994).
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Environment and Development, support the idea of eco-labeling. 6
However, "[t]he effectiveness of an eco-labeling scheme depends on its
acceptance by both producers and consumers. '7 Raising awareness
might cause consumers to respond by purchasing environmentally
friendly products, but eco-labeling programs will fail if customers do not
actually make the purchases and are not willing to pay the price
premium that accompanies labeled products.48 Indeed, there is often "a
yawning gap between what consumers say in surveys about what they
will buy and the actual sales data."49 Despite these obstacles, properly
implemented labeling programs, used in conjunction with other
proactive measures, are viable ways of addressing consumer fears over
GMOs.
Within the GMO debate, labeling divides the food market between
products that contain GMOs and those that do not. If the informed con-
sumer believes that GMOs lead to disastrous consequences, then the
market will create incentives for producers of non-GM foods. However,
GMOs may alter a product's characteristics to increase crop yield by
preventing the onset of disease, mitigating the effects of a drought or
making them pest-resistant.0 Consequently, products that do not contain
GMOs will cost more to produce and these non-GMO purchasers must
be willing to pay a price premium.
B. Criteria for Effective Eco-Labeling Schemes
According to theory behind eco-labeling, any such program must
possess certain attributes if it is to succeed. If eco-labels are to influence
consumer behavior, they must contain reliable information, so customers
can compare similar products over time.5' Criteria that change frequently
or multiple labeling programs might confuse consumers. Indeed, the
46. Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex 2, 4.21-22, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/4
(Part. I) (1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english!
agenda2ltoc.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Agenda 21]; Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Agenda 21 explicitly encourages
governments to encourage the expansion of eco-labeling and also to generally assist the public
in making environmentally informed choices. Agenda 21, supra, [ 4.21-22. Principle 10 of
the Rio Declaration implicitly endorses eco-labeling by encouraging the dissemination of
information to the public. Rio Declaration, supra, princ. 10. Despite the many countries that
signed onto both Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, they remain non-binding. See generally
APPLETON, supra note 40, at 64-66.
47. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 16.
48. See id.
49. Amy Cortese, They Care About the World (and They Shop, Too), N.Y TIMES, July
20, 2003, § 1, at 4.
50. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
51. See Staffin, supra note 9, at 215; Okubo, supra note 35, at 604.
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OECD attributes the moderate success of labeling to the "proliferation of
all types of environmental labels on products[, creating] confusion
among consumers."" As a result, there is a need for recognizable labels,53
as customers cannot complete a green purchase if they are unable to dis-
tinguish between environmentally sound products and environmentally
harmful products.
Additionally, eco-labels must contain accurate, verifiable informa-
tion. Without this, consumers will likely remain skeptical of labeled
products. Maintaining customer confidence requires the avoidance of
self-serving statements by manufacturers in favor of independently ad-
ministered programs." The WTO's Committee on Trade and the
Environment ("CTE") recognizes that labeling schemes "should be de-
signed so as to ensure that they provide sufficient and accurate
information to consumers regarding the relative environmental impacts
of competing products.5 6 According to the CTE, accurate information
requires "truthfulness, scientific basis and substantiability.'' 57 Therefore,
auditing labeling schemes to ensure the accuracy of claims is impor-
tant.5
Maximizing the environmental benefits of eco-labels also requires
the incorporation of the complete information of a product's impact.
59
Life-cycle assessment, also termed cradle-to-grave analysis, provides
such comprehensive information. 60 The EPA defines life-cycle
assessment as "[a] concept and methodology to evaluate the
environmental effects of a product or activity holistically, by analyzing
the whole life cycle of a particular product, process, or activity. ' A life-
cycle assessment reflects the concept that the most severe environmental
problems occur during the production process, rather than during a
52. OECD, Eco-LABELLING, supra note 43, at 67.
53. See Salzman, supra note 6, at 43.
54. See Peter S. Menell, Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Structuring a Market-
Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L REV. 1435, 1445 (1995).
55. See id.
56. Committee on Trade and Environment, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade
and Environment 65, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/40 (Nov. 12, 1996) [hereinafter CTE Report].
57. Id.
58. DANIEL C. ETSY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
172 (1994).
59. See Salzman, supra note 6, at 41.
60. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 5.
61. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE USE OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING 2 (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/library/pdfs/
lifecycleassessment.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
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product's useful life or disposal.62 Thus, a life-cycle assessment accounts
for all stages of a product's life.
Finally, inherent in the success of eco-labels is the creation of a
niche market for green goods, conferring a comparative advantage for
certain producers. 63 To accommodate this need, only products represent-
ing a small percentage of market-share should receive eco-labels.
64
Therefore, "[flor eco-labels to reach their optimal objective, a balance
should be reached between the stringency of the criteria and the number
of eco-labeled products., 65 As an increased number of producers alter
their products and production methods to meet an eco-label's standards,
the criteria for awarding a label should become stricter. This encourages
producers to seek out production methods that are even more environ-
mentally friendly.66 This aspect of green consumerism will be absent
from any GM-labeling program because labels identifying GM products
attempt to reverse this effect by excluding certain products from the
market at large. Additionally, any resulting non-GM product market can
hardly be a niche market, because of the existence of many non-GM
products.
Momentarily ignoring any negative international trade implications,
the recent EC regulations must incorporate a significant number of the
characteristics of effective labeling programs if the regulations are to
accomplish their environmental goals. Where a mandatory labeling
scheme fails to meet crucial elements, such as truthfulness and scientific
basis, it is easier to view the regulations as a disguised barrier to trade
rather then an environmental protection tool.
IV. EC REGULATORY FRAMEWORK SURROUNDING THE
LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
The general legislation governing the release and marketing of
GMOs in the EC is Directive 2001/1 8.67 This horizontal Directive im-
plements "a step-by-step approval process on a case by case assessment
of the risks to human health and the environment before any GMO or
62. Ren6 Vossenaar, Process and Production Methods: Sizing Up the Issues from the
South, in TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 152, 153 (Halina Ward & Duncan
Black eds., 2000).
63. See Salzman, supra note 6, at 43.
64. Id. at 42-43.
65. OECD, EcO-LABELLING, supra note 43, at 68.
66. ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 13.
67. Council and European Parliament Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 Mar. 2001 On the
Deliberate Release Into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing
Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) [hereinafter Directive 2001/18].
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product consisting or containing GMOs ... can be released into the en-
vironment or placed on the market., 68 Additionally, there is sectoral
legislation governing specific types of GMOs. 69 Directive 2001/18 defers
to sectoral legislation where it establishes equivalent standards for risk
assessment. °
One of the sectoral instruments accompanying Directive 2001/18 is
the Novel Foods Regulation.7' In response to consumer fears over the
potential negative effects of "novel foods," the Novel Food Regulation
mandates the labeling of a novel food product 72 to indicate the presence
of GMOs. The avowed purpose of the Novel Foods Regulation is to pro-
tect public health, inform consumers, and subject novel food and food
ingredients to a risk assessment before their placement on the market.
Article 8 of this regulation details the labeling requirements for novel
foods.73
On October 18, 2003, the EC published new regulations concerning
the labeling of food products with GMOs. Regulation (EC) No.
1829/2003 ("Food and Feed Regulation") focuses on genetically modi-
fied food and feed, while Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003 ("Traceability
and Labeling Regulation") concerns the traceability and labeling of
GMOs and the traceability of food and feed products produced from
GMOs.74 These regulations begin to apply on April 18, 2004, with the
Food and Feed Regulation preempting the Novel Foods Regulations with
respect to novel foods or food ingredients containing or produced from
GMOs.75 Additionally, products covered by the Food and Feed Regula-
tion are exempt from the notification and labeling requirements of
68. Press Release, European Commission, Question and Answers on the Regulation
of GMOs in the EU 1 (Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/16&format=PDF&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited July 15, 2004).
69. See, e.g., Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 of 27
January 1997 Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, 1997 O.J. (L 043) [here-
inafter Novel Foods].
70. Directive 2001/18, supra note 67, art. 12.1, at 8.
71. Novel Foods, supra note 69.
72. The Novel Foods Regulation defines a "novel food" as "a food or food ingredient
no longer equivalent to an existing food or food ingredient .... having regard to the accepted
limits of natural variations for [the characteristics of a conventional food or food ingredient]."
Id. art. 8.1 (a), at 5.
73. Id. art. 8, at 5.
74. HILDE BRANS, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, GAIN REPORT E23197,
EUROPEAN UNION FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORT REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 1
(2003), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200310/145986500.pdf (last visited
Dec. 13, 2003).
75. Food and Feed, supra note 13, pmbl. 11, at 2; However, the Novel Food Regula-
tions still apply to novel foods that do not consist of GMOs. See id.
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Directive 2001/18.76 Because this Note focuses on consumer market
mechanisms, it will examine the requirements for genetically modified
food and ignore the section of the regulations on genetically modified
feed.
The Food and Feed Regulation seeks to "ensur[e] a high level of
protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, environ-
mental and consumer interests in relation to genetically modified food
and feed, whilst ensuring the effective functioning of the [EC's] internal
market. '77 Thus, in comparison with the objective of Directive 2001/18,78
the Food and Feed Regulation has a wider scope.79
Under the Food and Feed Regulation, before selling a regulated-
product within the EC, a producer must submit an application to a com-
petent authority of an EC member state.80 The competent authority then
forwards the application to the European Food Safety Authority
("EFSA"), which issues an opinion on the application.8 The labeling
provisions cover foods that "contain or consist of GMOs" or "are pro-
duced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs." 2 The
regulation establishes a de minimis exception for foods that contain no
higher than 0.9% of GMO ingredients, "provided that this presence is
adventitious or technically unavoidable."83 The authorization application
includes, inter alia: descriptions of the production process; scientific
studies relating to the adverse consequences of a product; statements that
the food does not give rise to ethical or religious concerns; proposals for
monitoring the post-consumption effects; and labeling proposals.84 Dur-
ing the evaluation process, the EFSA considering the application
consults with competent national authorities in member states.85 Once the
EFSA reaches its decision, the opinion is publicly available and the pub-
76. Id. art. 43, at 20-21. Because this Note focus on the specific requirements of the
Food and Feed regulation and the Traceability and Labeling Regulation, it does not consider
Directive 2001/18. For a discussion on Directive 2001/18's compliance with the SPS Agree-
ment, see Aaron A. Ostrovksy, Note, The New Codex Alimentarius Commission Standards For
Food Created with Modern Biotechnology: Implications for the EC GMO Framework's Com-
pliance with the SPS Agreement, 25 MIcH. J. INT'L LAW 813 (2004).
77. Food and Feed, supra note 13, art. 1 (a), at 5.
78. Directive 2001/18, supra note 67, art. 1, at 4.
79. Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
213, 217 (2003).
80. Food and Feed, supra note 13, art. 5.2, at 7. Essentially, there will be one competent
national authority in each EC member state. This note will refer to EC members as "member
states." "Member" is a reference to a WTO party.
81. Id. art. 6, at 8-9.
82. Id. art. 12.1, at 11.
83. Id. art. 12.2, at 11.
84. Id. art. 5.3, at 7.




lic may make comments regarding the decision to the European Com-
mission ("Commission").86 In turn, the Commission submits a draft
decision and a regulatory committee issues a final decision.87 After a
producer receives authorization, it is subject to the supervision of the
Commission, which may modify, suspend or revoke such authorization.
81A producer must also renew the authorization after ten years.
Once in receipt of an authorization, a producer must follow the spe-
cific labeling provisions of Article 13. The requirements detail specific
phrases to be used, the size of the label, and the location on the product
in order to inform the consumer of the presence of GMOs. For example,
if the product contains a list of ingredients, the words "genetically modi-
fied" or "produced from genetically modified (name of the ingredient)"
must immediately follow the altered ingredient. ° If there is no list of
ingredients, then words indicating the presence of GMOs "shall appear
clearly on the label[]. ' '9' The label must also mention:
(a) [when] a food is different from its conventional counterpart
as regards [to] the following characteristics or properties:
(i) composition; (ii) nutritional value or nutritional effects;
(iii) intended use of the food; [or] (iv) implications for the health
of certain sections of the population, [and] (b) [when] a food
92may give rise to ethical or religious concerns.
Through the Traceability and Labelling Regulation, the EC seeks to
monitor the effects of GMOs and to facilitate the withdrawal of GM
products subsequently deemed harmful to public health and the envi-
ronment.93 The regulation does so by imposing notification and labeling
requirements on any person involved in the production and distribution
chain of the product (except the consumer).94 The authorization and la-
beling requirements of the Traceability and Labelling Regulation mirrors
the spirit of the Food and Feed Regulation.
The purported focus of the two regulations classify them as a label-
ing schemes designed to protect the environment, human and animal
welfare and to protect consumer choice. Despite this, their environmen-
tally protective nature will not insulate them from scrutiny under
international trade law. Generally, eco-labeling schemes are subject to
86. Id. art. 6.7, at 9.
87. Id. arts. 7.1, 7.3, at 9.
88. Id. arts. 9, 10, at 10.
89. Id. art. 11, at 10-11.
90. Id. art. 13.1(a), at 11.
91. Id. art. 13.1(c), at 11.
92. Id. art. 13.2, at 11-12.
93. Traceability and Labelling, supra note 13, art. 1, at 25.
94. Id. arts. 3.5, 4, at 25-26.
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different levels of analysis under the WTO, depending on characteristics
of a given program. Therefore, a brief discussion of the types of eco-
labeling schemes is necessary.
V. CATEGORIES OF EcO-LABELING
Outside of the GMO debate, there exist a variety of eco-labeling
schemes, each unique in their formation, scope and administration.95
These schemes contain varying levels of government involvement.
96
Some seek to identify only one particular aspect or use of a product
while others incorporate a more holistic assessment of the product. The
specific characteristics of a labeling scheme drive the analysis of that
scheme under the WTO Agreements.98
A. As Determined by Level of Government Involvement
The first characteristic to examine is the level of governmental in-
volvement in the labeling scheme. The significance of the level of
government involvement in the formation and administration of an eco-
labeling scheme arises from the nature of international law and the struc-
ture of the WTO.99 Traditionally, international law is the law of nations,
imposing rights and responsibilities on nation-states rather than on pri-
vate individuals or private organizations. Additionally, the WTO is the
product of a multi-lateral treaty regime.l°& Thus, international trade law
and the WTO trade rules arguably apply to state action and not private
action, ' °' and it appears that the greater the level of government involve-
ment, the more the WTO trade rules become relevant.
1. Mandatory Schemes
Mandatory labeling schemes exhibit the greatest level of government
involvement.'02 Under these programs, a government regulation requires
a product's label to contain certain information before a manufacturer
95. See Staffin, supra note 9, at 211-24.
96. Id.
97. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 5-8.
98. See infra Part. VI.
99. See APPLETON, supra note 40, at 27.
100. See id. at 87-89.
101. The possibility that the TBT Agreement imposes responsibilities on states to control
the actions of local governments and private entities is considered in Part. VId, infra.




can sell it.' °3 Due to their mandatory nature, these schemes are not pure
market mechanisms. However, they nonetheless operate as a market-
oriented policy tool because there is no outright product ban.'04
Mandatory labeling regulations can either be content-neutral or con-
tent-negative. 5 Content-neutral schemes serve an informative purpose,
"provid[ing] ... the consumer [with] reliable product information, which
might not be otherwise disclosed, in order to facilitate a purchasing deci-
sion."' ° In contrast, content-negative schemes serve to warn consumers
of a product's harmfulness, thus acting as "compulsory 'negative adver-
tising.' 9"0' Because the EC regulations are in response to fear of GMOs,
the regulations impose requirements that place it in the mandatory nega-
tive-content category.' 8 While the EC's scheme does not fit within the
other categories, an introduction is useful for context and important for
structuring a WTO-friendly program.
2. Government Sponsored Voluntary Schemes
A reduced level of government involvement characterizes govern-
ment sponsored voluntary labeling schemes.' °9 Unlike a regulation,
compliance with these schemes is up to the whim of the manufacturer,
and governments take an active role in either the development, admini-
stration or funding of the program." ° The labels often extol the positive
attributes of a product by awarding an identifiable label to a product that
meets pre-established criteria, often based on some form of life-cycle
assessment."' Such labels are "content-positive. ' '" 2 Unlike mandatory
103. Staffin, supra note 9, at 211.
104. See Okubo, supra note 35, at 603.
105. Staffin, supra note 9, at 215; Okubo, supra note 35, at 604.
106. Staffin, supra note 9, at 214 (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS WORLDWIDE 24 (1993) [hereinafter
EPA, STATUS REPORT]). The EPA and DOE's fuel economy guides are content-neutral labels.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 211 (providing the example of the U.S. Clean Air Act requiring products
containing or manufactured from chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons to carry
a warning label).
108. In contrast, regulations that required a product label to say, "This product does not
contain genetically modified organisms," would be a positive-content scheme. See Okubo,
supra note 35, at 604-05.
109. See Erik P Bartenhagen, Note, The Intersection of Trade and the Environment: An
Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Ecolabeling Programs, 17 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 51, 56 (1997); Okubo, supra note 35, at 605.
110. Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 56.
111. Id. at 57; For a basic discussion in life-cycle assessments, see supra notes 61-63
and accompanying text.
112. Okubo, supra note 35, at 604-05.
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content-neutral or negative-content schemes, the labels often do not
elaborate on the specific reasons for the placement of the label."1 3
3. Private Sponsored Voluntary Schemes
There is no formal level of governmental involvement in private vol-
untary labeling schemes." 4 Private schemes can take the form of self-
declarations or third-party verifications. Self-declarations occur when a
manufacturer declares that a product is environmentally friendly."5 Inevi-
tably, these claims suffer from credibility problems and consumer
skepticism."6 In contrast, third-party schemes avoid these problems due
to their unbiased appearance. 17 Labels monitored by third-parties are
similar to government sponsored voluntary programs, and often include
the placement of a label generally praising the environmental benefits of
a product."8
B. As Determined by Depth of Analysis:
Single and Multiple-Criteria Schemes
The second important criterion to examine is the depth of the analy-
sis done by the labeling authority. Single-attribute schemes describe one
specific trait of a product, but do not provide an overall view of the
product's environmental impact." 9 These programs are flexible and less
costly to implement, but are replete with shortcomings.2 0 Focusing on
one area, such as GMOs, may camouflage other positive environmental
aspects of the product.'2 ' Additionally, such labels provide little informa-
tion to consumers comparing similar food products consisting of
ingredients from many different countries.22 Finally, a voluntarily ad-
ministered single attribute scheme is particularly susceptible to
misstatements by producers.
23
On the other hand, multiple-criteria schemes provide a consumer, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, with a more complete assessment of a
product's environmental impact.' 24 These schemes rely to some extent on
113. Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 56-57.
114. Id. at 57; Okubo, supra note 35, at 607.
115. Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 57-58; Okubo, supra note 35, at 607-09.
116. Staffin, supra note 9, at 216 (citing EPA, STATUS REPORT, supra note 106, at 6);
Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 57-58.
117. Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 59; Okbuo, supra note 35, at 607-08.
118. Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 58.
119. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 8;




124. See id. at 5.
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a life-cycle assessment, and result in the placement of labels that act as
either a content-neutral report card or a seal of approval,'25 and do not
provide detailed information to the consumer of the environmental
analysis behind the label.
2 6
For analysis under the WTO Agreements, it generally is helpful to
classify a labeling program as either based on single-attribute or multi-
ple-criteria assessment. However, these distinctions might be misleading
and problematic, as the EC's regulations aim to identify products con-
taining, consisting of, or produced from GMOs, thus arguably
implicating a quasi-life-cycle assessment while focusing on one product
attribute.
VI. WTO IMPLICATIONS
A. General Concerns with the EC Regulations
One of the fundamental concerns with a government regulation relat-
ing to product labeling is that it is a veiled non-tariff barrier to trade, in
violation of one of the WTO Agreements. 7 While the purpose of the
WTO is to promote free trade, the WTO does not positively limit the
ability of a member to enact domestic regulation.'28 Instead, members are
free to pursue domestic policies so long as they do not run afoul of the
WTO provisions on discrimination or arbitrariness.'29 Mandatory label-
ing implicates these provisions because requiring a label identifying a
given trait results in de facto discrimination against non-labeled prod-
ucts.3° At first glance, however, many of the arguments used to denounce
the legality of labeling schemes in international trade law appear inap-
plicable to the GMO debate.
The irrelevance of these arguments results from their non-traditional
source: developing countries. Historically, the trade and environment
debate maintains a North-South dimension, with developing countries
contesting the legality of environmental measures taken in the developed
125. Staffin, supra note 9, at 219-20. The extent that a life-cycle assessment incorpo-
rates non-product related process and production methods determines the applicability of the
TBT Agreement to the labeling scheme. See infra Part. VI.D.
126. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 5.
127. See Salzman, supra note 6, at 43.
128. Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for
GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
317, 318 (2000).
129. Id.; Parts V.C-E, infra, addresses the implicated provisions of the WTO Agree-
ments.
130. See Tietje, supra note 31, at 129.
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North.' Conversely, within the current debate, the United States is the
party contesting the legality of environmental measures, advocating the
interests of large multi-national corporations.3 2 Thus, few would view
the regulations as a unilateral attempt by developed countries to export
domestic environmental laws to developing countries or an unfair at-
tempt at penalizing developing countries for global environmental
problems they did not cause.133
Though external to the WTO, aspects of international environmental
law provide support for the EC regulations. Specifically, Principle 11 of
the Rio Declaration states that environmental legislation "should reflect
the environmental and developmental context to which [it] applies."'34
From the United States' perspective, it could not argue in good faith that
EC regulations run afoul of this principle. Following the language of
Principle 11, it is apparent that legislation in one developed country
would be appropriate in other developed countries.
3
1
It appears difficult for the United States to argue that the costs asso-
ciated with applications for product authorizations act as a barrier to
trade because the U.S. represents the interests of well-financed GMO
producers. Unlike an industrial manufacturer in Thailand, manufacturers
of GMOs should possess the financial resources to support their authori-
zation application. With the enormous capital expenditures that
accompany the development of GMOs, it would seem disingenuous to
argue that there are no additional funds available to market GM products
in Europe. However, the capital resources available to most U.S. compa-
nies may not be available in developing countries, which use GMOs
domestically in an attempt to reap the benefits of disease, drought, or
pest resistant GM crops and sell excess production to Europe.'36 The po-
tential use of GMOs by developing countries to increase agricultural
yield revives the argument that the EC regulations are an attempt to ex-
port EC law. Thus, producers in developing countries that are unable to
131. See Staffin, supra note 9, at 209-10.
132. See U.S. Panel Request, supra note 12, Annex I.
133. In United States-Tuna, a GATT Panel noted that if members were unilaterally to
export their domestic environmental policies, it would frustrate the purposes of the multilat-
eral trading agreement. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1594, 5.27 (1991) (not adopted).
134. Rio Declaration, supra note 46, princ. 11.
135. See id. The second sentence of Principle 11 states that "[s]tandards applied by some
countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other coun-
tries, in particular developing countries." Id. Thus, the focus of Principle 11 is taking into
account the differences between developing countries vis-a-vis developed countries and not
between developed countries.
136. See Staffin, supra note 9, at 266 (noting the concern by developing countries that




finance the authorization process might be forced to accept reduced
crop-yields (and less profits) or forgo the European market altogether.
1 37
A second fundamental concern with the EC regulations' validity
arises because the regulations are the product of a regional supranational
organ. Thus, producers from countries outside the EC lacked influence
during the development of the criteria required for authorization. This
lack of participation strengthens the possibility for discriminatory appli-
cation of the regulations. Generally, the decision to label a given product
often "reflect[s] local environmental conditions ... and local preferences
for specific environmental product attributes, which may ... result in
overlooking the positive environmental qualities of imported prod-
ucts."'38 Of course, as noted in Part II, there is a debate over whether the
benefits of GM product are positive environmental attributes. In either
event, this lack of involvement is a result of intra-EC priorities illustrated
by the scope of the regulations.
B. Background: GAT, the TBTAgreement
and the SPS Agreement
Analyzing the EC regulations under the WTO trade regime raises
doubts as to their legality. Specifically, the regulations concern three of
the WTO's annexed agreements: the SPS Agreement (detailing the rights
and obligations of members to implement domestic sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures), the TBT Agreement (detailing the obligations of
members with regard to the implementation of technical regulations and
standards), and GATT 1994 (containing, among other thing, provisions
on nondiscrimination).
The WTO Agreement structures its various related agreements in a
legal hierarchy, establishing which agreement prevails in the event of a
conflict.3 9 The WTO Agreement itself stands at the top of this hierarchy,
prevailing over any of the annexed multilateral trade agreements.
4
W
As between GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement, the general interpre-
tive note to Annex 1 A (containing the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in
Goods) provides: "In the event of conflict between a provision of the
[GATT 1994] and a provision of another agreement in Annex IA to the
[WTO Agreement], the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to
137. See Rick Weiss, Starved for Food, Zimbabwe Rejects U.S. Biotech Corn, WASH.
POST, July 31, 2002, at A12 (citing the hindrance of future exports of corn to Europe as a
possible reason for the Zimbabwe government rejecting food aid that includes GM corn).
138. Seung Wha Chang, GATing A Green Trade Barrier-Eco-Labelling and the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1997, at 137, 138.
139. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 87.
140. WTO Agreement, supra note 10, art. XVI(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1152.
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the extent of the conflict."4' Thus, if there is no direct conflict between
the two agreements, both apply. Where there is a direct conflict, the SPS
Agreement applies. This same analysis applies as between GATT 1994
and the TBT Agreement.
As between the SPS and TBT Agreements, the TBT Agreement
states that "the provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary and
phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex A of the [SPS Agree-
ment].' 42 Furthermore, the SPS Agreement provides that "[n]othing in
this Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the [TBT
Agreement] with respect to measures not within the scope of this
Agreement.', 43 Thus, as regards specific categories of measures, as de-
fined in SPS Annex A, the Appellate Body will apply the SPS Agreement
exclusively.' 4"
For analytical purposes, the WTO receives interpretive guidance
from the customary practices established by GATT.'45 Therefore, the
DSB and the WTO's Appellate Body ("Appellate Body") may look to-
wards GATT jurisprudence when interpreting analogous provisions in
the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement. Nonetheless, in European
Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products ("Asbestos"), the Appellate Body noted that similar provisions
throughout various agreements "must be interpreted in light of the con-
text, and of the object and purpose, of the provision at issue, and of the
141. Id. General interpretive note to Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. at 1154 (emphasis added).
Annex IA lists the WTO's annexed agreements, which include the SPS Agreement and the
TBT Agreement.
142. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.5, at 22052. Annex A of the SPS Agreement
defines a sanitary or phytosanitary measure as a measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member
from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organ-
isms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the en-
try, establishment or spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the en-
try, establishment or spread of pests.
SPS Agreement, supra note 16, Annex A(1), at 21903.
143. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1(4), at 21896.
144. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 128, at 321.
145. WTO Agreement, supra note 10, art. XVI(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1152. While the WTO's
Appellate Body often looks towards previous disputes for guidance, the principle of stare
decisis does not apply.
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object and purpose of the covered agreement in which the provision ap-
pears.' 46
C. Applying the SPS Agreement
1. Are the EC Regulations within the Scope
of the SPS Agreement?
As indicated above, if the EC regulations are a valid measure under
the SPS Agreement, exclusivity applies and the Appellate Body's inquiry
into the EC regulations should end. However, it must first be determined
if the SPS Agreement governs the EC regulations. The basic rights under
the SPS Agreement allow members "to take sanitary and phytosanitary
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement."''4 7 Annex A, which defines sanitary and
phytosanitary ("SPS") measures,' 41 provides that such measures include:
[A]ll relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and pro-
cedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and
production methods; testing, inspection, certification and ap-
proval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants,
or with the materials necessary for their survival during trans-
port; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling
procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and
labelling requirements directly related to food safety.
49
Thus, it appears that the SPS Agreement is clearly applicable to
mandatory labeling schemes. However, a textual analysis of the Food
and Feed Regulation raises some doubts as to whether they can with-
stand scrutiny as an SPS measure.5 Specifically, the SPS Agreement
does not explicitly authorize measures deemed to protect consumer in-
terests. While Annex A states that an SPS measure may be in the form of
"packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety,"''
it mentions nothing about protecting consumer interests. The Food and
146. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, 88.
147. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2, at 21896.
148. Id. Annex A(1), at 21903.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Scott, supra note 79, at 228; Julian Wong, Note, Are Biotech Crops and
Conventional Crops Like Products? An Analysis under GATT, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 0027, 12 (2003), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/PDF/
2003DLTR0027.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
151. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, Annex A(1), at 21903 (emphasis added).
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Feed Regulation lists consumer protection as a goal. Thus, it is possi-
ble that the rule of SPS exclusivity delineated in TBT Article 1.5 no
longer applies.53
In contrast to the Food and Feed Regulation, the Traceability and
Labeling Regulation more closely conforms to the definition of an SPS
measure, as its stated objectives do not explicitly include promoting con-
sumer interests.'54 However, the preamble of the regulation references the
goals of ensuring consumer choice in accordance with the Food and
Feed Regulation.15 Because the EC regulations encompass a broader
range of objectives than the SPS Agreement allows, it is likely the Ap-
pellate Body would also analyze them under the TBT Agreement.'
5 6
2. Are the EC Regulations Consistent
with the SPS Agreement?
Assuming arguendo that the Appellate Body concludes that the regu-
lations fit within the scope of the SPS Agreement, the regulations must
still satisfy the Agreement's basic requirements. First, under the SPS
Agreement, measures must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate
between members and may not be disguised restrictions on international
trade. "'57 This general obligation mirrors the chapeau to GATT's Article
XX, discussed below. Second, under SPS Article 2.2, members must en-
sure that measures are "based on scientific principles and [are] not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. . . .""' Third, SPS Arti-
cle 5.1 requires measures to be "based on an assessment.., appropriate
to the circumstances ... taking into account risk assessment techniques
developed by the relevant international organizations.' ' 59 Accordingly,
SPS measures must utilize a risk assessment procedure unless then con-
form to international standards.' 6°
152. Food and Feed, supra note 13, art. l(a), at 5. The Food and Feed Regulation also
contains requirements addressing religious and ethical concerns. Id. arts. 5.3(g), 12.2(b), at 7,
12.
153. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 128, at 321.
154. See Traceability and Labelling, supra note 13, art. 1, at 25.
155. Id. pmbl. U 6, 11, at 24-25.
156. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environ-
ment: The Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement
of the World Trade Organization, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 1, 32 (2003).
157. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(3), at 21896.
158. Id. art. 2(2), at 21896.
159. Id. art. 5(1), at 21898.
160. Robert Howse & Joshua Meltzer, The Significance of the Protocol for WTO Dispute
Settlement, in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECH-




a. International Standards and the Presumption of
Consistency wth the SPS Agreement
When a member bases an SPS measure on international standards,
then the measure is presumptively consistent with the SPS Agreement
and GATT 1994.16' Annex A lists three international organizations whose
standards, guidelines and recommendations are international standards
for the purposes of the SPS Agreement: the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission (for food safety), the International Office of Epizootics (for
animal health and zoonoses), and the International Plant Protection Con-
vention (for plant health).'62 If one of these three organizations has not
issued guidelines, international standards can come from "other relevant
international organizations open for membership to all Members.'
63
The recent adoption of four texts by the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission ("Codex Commission")'6 for assessing GMO risks lends
significant support to the general EC framework envisaged in Directive
2001/18. The central text issued by the Codex Commission, the Draft
Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Bio-
technology ("Draft Principles"), encompasses the broad principles of
risk assessment, risk management, risk communication, consistency, ca-
pacity building and information exchange and review. 165 As indicated
above, regulations that "conform to" the standards issued by the Codex
Commission are presumptively SPS and GATT 1994 legal. Therefore, if
the provisions for risk assessment in the EC regulations "conform to"
those in the Draft Principles, then this part of the EC regulations will
survive scrutiny under the SPS Agreement. To date, the Codex Commis-
sion has yet to complete and issue guidelines for the labeling of GM
food.' 66 Thus, even assuming that the EC provisions on risk assessment
"conform to" the Draft Principles, the EC might still have to look else-
where to justify the portion of the regulations governing labeling as in
conformity with international standards.
Because the Codex Commission has yet to issue standards governing
the labeling of GMOs, it is possible that the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-
safety ("Biosafety Protocol") 67  provides the necessary relevant
161. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 3(2), at 21897.
162. Id. Annex A(3), at 21903.
163. Id. Annex A(3)(d), at 21904.
164. Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 03/34, Report of the Third Session of
the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology
(2003).
165. Id. at 44-46.
166. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 03/22A, Report of the Thirty-
First Session of the Codex Committee on Food Labelling 74, at 9 (2003).
167. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. The Biosafety Protocol uses the term
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international standards.'68 In a trade dispute governing GMOs, the Appel-
late Body may look towards the Biosafety Protocol in determining
whether the disputing parties are fulfilling their WTO obligations." 9
However, as described below, the EC's ability to rely on the Biosafety
Protocol is tenuous.
Both the Biosafety Protocol and the SPS Agreement base risk as-
sessments on a variety of factors and import the precautionary principle
to allow for the adoption of precautionary measures.' 70 In European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products ("Beef
Hormones"), the Appellate Body elaborated on the relationship between
the SPS Agreement and the precautionary principle, noting first that "the
principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for
justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of Members set out in particular provisions of [the SPS
Agreement]."' 7 ' The Appellate Body also noted while SPS Article 5.7
reflects the precautionary principle, this does not exhaust the relevance
of the Article and it is helpful in interpreting other provisions of the
Agreement.7 Thus, precaution can play a role in the adoption of an SPS
measure.
Despite the references to precaution in both the EC regulations and
the Biosafety Protocol, the critical inquiry in determining whether the
EC regulations benefit from the presumption of legality under the SPS
Agreement is whether they "conform to" the relevant provisions of the
Biosafety Protocol. 13 In Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body concluded
that the phrase "conforms to," as used in SPS Article 3.2, suggests a
fairly close fit between the regulation and the international standard.'
74
However, this does not require an exact fit.7' Thus, in determining
whether a measure "conforms to" international standards, Howse and
Mavroidis point out that the "real issue is whether in all relevant respects
"living modified organism" (LMO) to mean "any living organism that possesses a novel com-
bination of genetic material obtained through the use of modem biotechnology." Id. art. 3(g),
39 I.L.M. at 1028. In discussing the Biosafety Protocol, this Note uses "GMO" instead.
168. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 156, at 45-47.
169. Howse & Meltzer, supra note 160, at 483; for a discussion of the role of non-WTO
international agreements in WTO disputes, see Stewart & Johanson, supra note 156, at 33-38.
170. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 167, arts. 10, 15, Annex 1I, 39 I.L.M. at 1031, 1033,
1045; SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 5, at 21898-99.
171. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Jan. 16, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/RIU.S.A, WT/DS48/R/CAN, 124.
172. Id.
173. Cf. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 128, at 327.
174. Hormones, supra note 171,[ 163.
175. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 128, at 332.
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the [EC] regulation does not attempt to achieve a higher level of protec-
tion than that which would be achieved by international standards."'
76
Comparing the objectives of the EC regulations with those of the
Biosafety Protocol presents some indication of non-conformity. Unlike
the EC regulations, the Biosafety Regulations do not explicitly require a
label before placing a GM product on the market. However, as Howse
and Mavroidis indicate, labeling might be a necessary implication to ful-
fill the Biosafety Protocol's requirements of risk management.'
7
Assuming this is correct, the EC's labeling requirements in the Food and
Feed Regulation arguably still seek a higher level of protection than the
Biosafety Protocol. Specifically, Article 13 of the Food and Feed Regula-
tion requires a statement where a particular food "may give rise to
ethical or religious concerns."'78 In contrast, the Biosafety Protocol's
provisions on identification focus on "the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, taking ... into account risks to human
health."179 By protecting subjects beyond the scope of the Biosafety Pro-
tocol, it is possible that EC regulations seek a higher level of protection
than international standards. If so, then the regulations would lose the
presumption of validity encompassed in SPS Article 3.2.
b. Requirement of Minimal Intrusion on International Trade
A final relevant requirement of the SPS Agreement is that SPS
measures must not be "more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility."8 ° The SPS Agreement em-
ploys a "reasonably available" analysis when determining if there is a
less-restrictive measure.' The mandatory nature of the EC regulations
fails to comport with the EC's least-restrictive obligations. This does not
imply that all mandatory rules are SPS-illegal, but only ones where there
is a viable alternative. A viable alternative to the compulsory labeling
requirements imposed by the EC regulations is voluntary eco-labeling.
The existence of voluntary schemes for environmental product labeling
provides evidence of technical feasibility. 2 Regarding economic feasi-
bility, there is little reason to assume the costs of a private scheme will
176. Id. at 356.
177. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 167, art. 16, 39 I.L.M. at 1034; Howse & Mavroidis,
supra note 128, at 358.
178. Food and Feed, supra note 13, art. 13.2(b), at 12.
179. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 167, art. 18.1, 39 I.L.M. at 1035.
180. SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 5(6), at 21898.
181. Id. art. 5(6), at 21898 n.3.
182. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 43-
49 (discussing Germany's Blue Angle label, part. of a government-sponsored voluntary pro-
gram).
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be any greater than those associated with the application process under
the Food and Feed and Traceability and Labeling Regulation. Further-
more, while the text of the SPS Agreement demonstrates its applicability
to labeling requirements, such labeling measures are not adequate to ad-
dress SPS risks, as compared with outright import restrictions."'
Therefore, the policies of the EC's labeling program do not line up with
protecting against SPS risks.
D. Applying the TBTAgreement
1. Are the EC Regulations within the Scope
of the TBT Agreement?
Due to the uncertain nature of the EC regulations as a valid SPS
measure, it is also appropriate to analyze the EC regulations under the
TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement seeks "to ensure that technical
regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling
requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical
regulations do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade" by
establishing more specific obligations than GATT 1994. 1 4 Additionally,
the Agreement recognizes that, "no country should be prevented from tak-
ing measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health," as long as those
measures are non-arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory.85
The use of life-cycle assessments in labeling regimes fuels a debate
over the scope of the TBT Agreement. A textual interpretation of the
treaty makes it clear that the TBT agreement governs both mandatory
and voluntary labels that cover process and production methods
("PPMs") that affect a product's physical characteristics ("product-
related PPMs").18 6 Though there is no uniform definition of product-
related PPMs, "[they] are used to assure the functionality of the product,
or to safeguard the consumer who uses the product."' 8 7 However, there is
uncertainty over whether the TBT Agreement regulates PPMs not related
to a product's physical characteristics ("non-product-related PPMs"),
which often are "designed to achieve a social purpose that may or may
not matter to a consumer."'88 To date, there have been no Appellate Body
183. See APPLETON, supra note 40, at 138.
184. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl. para. 5, at 22051.
185. Id. pmbl. para. 6, at 22051.
186. Chang, supra note 138, at 141.
187. Steve Chamovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs" in the WTO: Debunking the
Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59, 65 (2002).
188. Id. at 65. Chamovitz also notes the flaws with the simplistic use of the re-
lated/unrelated distinction. Id. at 66.
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decisions on the whether the TBT Agreement covers non-product-related
PPMs. Analysis of the negotiating history of the treaty suggests that the
Agreement does not cover standards based on non-product-related
PPMs,8 9 but does not reveal any similar exclusion for technical regula-
tions.
While there is no definitive Appellate Body decision on this issue,
the generally accepted view is that the TBT Agreement covers only la-
bels based on product-related PPMs.' 90 To support this, one scholar
observes that an ambiguity in the text arises because in the second sen-
tences defining both technical regulations and standards, the words "or
(their) related" does not appear between "product" and "process."' 9' In-
stead, the sentences both state, "[i]t may also include or deal exclusively
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling require-
ments as they apply to a product, process or production method.' 92
Thus, if the Appellate Body concludes that the TBT Agreement does
not cover non-product-related PPMs, then the Agreement will only apply
to the EC regulations that apply to GMOs for food use or food that con-
tains or consists of GMOs, not to the part of the regulations governing
non-product-related PPMs. 93
2. Are the EC Regulations a Non-Tariff Trade Barrier
in Violation of the TBT Agreement?
a. The Classification of EC Regulations
To assess the legality of a non-tariff trade barrier, the TBT Agree-
ment creates two classes of rules, one for technical regulations and one
for standards. A technical regulation is a "[d]ocument which lays down
product characteristics or their related processes and production meth-
ods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as
they apply to a product, process or production method."' 94 In contrast, a
standard is a:
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for
189. For a detailed discussion, see Chang, supra note 138, at 142-47.
190. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 93 (finding support in the negotiating history of the
TBT Agreement).
191. Chang, supra note 138, at 142.
192. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, at Annex 1(1-2), at 22066.
193. See Food and Feed, supra note 13, art. 1, at 5-6; Traceability and Labelling, supra
note 13, art. 1, at 25.
194. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, at Annex 1(1), at 22066.
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products or related processes and production methods, with
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method. 95
For classification purposes, the difference between the two is the
compulsory nature of technical regulations-compliance with standards
is not mandatory.' 96 Thus, the mandatory nature of the EC regulations
places them in the category of technical regulations.
b. TBT Agreement's Rules Governing
Technical Regulations
TBT Article 2 governs the preparation, adoption, and application of
technical regulations by central government bodies. TBT Article 2.1 im-
ports the most-favored-nation ("MFN") and national treatment
obligations from GATT, requiring members to accord imported products
"treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of na-
tional origin and to like products originating in other countries.' 197 TBT
Article 2.2 requires that regulations not create "unnecessary obstacles to
international trade.' 99 For this purpose, a regulation must "not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create."' 99 Legitimate objec-
tives include "[the] protection of human health or safety, animal or plant
life or health, or the environment
"2
00
Where possible, regulations must use relevant international stan-
dards. If the international standards are used, then there is a rebuttable
presumption that the regulation is not an "unnecessary obstacle to
trade."20' The TBT Agreement, unlike the SPS Agreement, has no explicit
reference to any external standards.2 However, TBT Article 2.9 contains
notice and consultation requirements that must be met if relevant interna-
tional standards do not exist.203 However, a member may forgo these
requirements in urgent situations, provided it notifies other members of
195. Id. at Annex 1(2), at 22066.
196. APPLETON, supra note 40, at 93.
197. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.1, at 22052. The MFN and National Treat-
ment principles are addressed in greater detail in Part. VIE, infra.
198. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.2, at 22052.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. arts. 2.4-5, at 22052.
202. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
203. See TBT Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.9, at 22053.
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the urgent problem.'0 Regardless of whether the EC based the regula-
tions on international standards, the regulations run into difficulty with
the EC's obligations under the TBT agreement.
1. Compliance with TBT Article 2.1
On their face, the preamble of the EC regulations appear to comport
with the TBT Agreement's MFN and national treatment principles. It is
difficult to tell if the regulations actually correspond because it is impos-
sible to predict exactly how the European Food and Safety Authority will
apply the EC regulations. However, the preamble of Food and Feed
Regulation provides that "requirements arising from this Regulation
should apply in a non-discriminatory manner to products originating in
the [European] Community and imported from third countries."2 °5 Fur-
thermore the regulations apply across the board to both EU and non-EU
producers.
i) "Like Product" Test
Even if there are some concerns with the EC regulations, in practice,
GATT jurisprudence will uphold the restrictions so long as they do not
discriminate against "like products."2' However, what constitutes a "like
product" is debatable, as none of the WTO Agreements define the term.
Complicating this analysis is that the meaning of "like products" de-
pends on the object and purpose of the agreement where the provision
207appears.
In seeking to validate the regulations, the EC will argue that GM
products are sufficiently different than similar non-GM products. This
reflects the EC view that once science uses biotechnology to modify a
product (as opposed to traditional hybridization techniques), it is substan-
tially different.2"8 The regulations support this belief by stating: "the
labelling should give information about any characteristic or property
which renders a food or feed different from its conventional counterpart
with respect to composition, nutritional value or nutritional effects."2°9 Ad-
ditionally, the application for authorization must include an analysis
"showing that the characteristics of the food are not different from those of
its conventional counterpart having regard to accepted limits of natural
204. Id. art. 2.10, at 22053.
205. Food and Feed, supra note 13, pmbl. 43, at 5.
206. Okubo, supra note 35, at 612.
207. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
208. See Kim JoDene Donat, Note, Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information Asymme-
try, Externalities, and Market Information in the Genetically Modified Food Market, 12 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 417,429 (2003).
209. Food and Feed, supra note 13, pmbl. 22, at 3.
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variations for such characteristics. '210 Overall, the text appears to exempt
food that bears a substantial similarity to its non-GM counterpart.
In spite of these narrow exemptions, the regulations still raise prob-
lems under a "like products" analysis. Initially, the differentiation of a
conventional and non-conventional product, based on "accepted limits of
natural variations," lacks certainty. This vague definition allows the
European Food Safety Authority to finesse its judgment when making an
authorization decision on a product. Therefore, the administration of the
regulation may result in de facto discrimination of similar products, vio-
lating the TBT Agreement.
ii) Previous GATT Panel and Appellate Body Reports
on "Like Products" Issues
Previous GATT Panel ("Panel") reports considering the "like prod-
ucts" issue also raises questions of the legality of the EC regulations.
The Panel in Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages focused its inquiry first on
whether the products were "directly competitive or substitutable," and
second on whether the scheme was discriminatory or protective.21 ' Later
Panel and Appellate Body decisions, where the likeness of the products
was not straightforward, modified this process into a single, continuous
step,2 with a finding of likeness dependent on finding of a protective
purpose, such as the protection of domestic markets.
Applying these principles to the EC regulations, it is difficult to de-
termine whether GM and non-GM products are directly competitive or
substitutable. Significant levels of consumer fear over GM products sup-
port the argument that the products occupy two different markets.
However, it is important to note that these Panel decisions interpreted
regulations as tariff regulations under GATT and not as technical barriers
under the TBT. Even though Panels may draw interpretive guidance
from prior GATT decisions, a dispute under the TBT Agreement requires
special considerations due to the technical nature of the barrier. Overall,
whether the EC regulations discriminate against like products is difficult
to determine due to the nuanced argument over how similar products
must be to qualify as "like products."
210. Id. art. 5.3(f), at 7.
211. Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATI B.I.S.D (34th Supp.) at 83, 5.5; APPLETON,
supra note 40, at 97.
212. See APPLETON, supra note 40, at 97-99.
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2. Compliance with TBT Article 2.2
In contrast, the EC labeling scheme encounters obstacles under Arti-
cle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which requires regulations not to create
"unnecessary obstacles to trade." The "legitimate objective" element of
this provision allows the EC to rely on the various phrases in the regula-
tion relating directly to health, safety and the environment. Once again,
however, the breadth of the regulations might limit the EC's ability to
argue that the EC regulations fulfill a legitimate objective, as protection
of consumer interests is not among the enumerated objectives of the
TBT Agreement. Of course, there may be sufficient overlap between
regulations protecting human health and regulations promoting con-
sumer choice to sustain the EC regulations as fulfilling a legitimate
objective under the TBT.
3. Compliance with TBT Article 2.9
Because no international standards regarding labeling exist, the EC
does not have to base the labeling aspect of its program on international
standards. However, the recently adopted standards by the Codex Com-
mission concerning risk assessment procedures for GMOs may alter this
analysis. Despite possibly receiving this protection, the EC regulations
subsequently violate Article 2.9, which require notice and consultation
before the implementation of a technical regulation.
The regulations also run into difficulty under the "not more trade-
restrictive than necessary" clause. Under this least-restrictive analysis,
the Appellate Body has considerable discretion. Unlike the least restric-
tive means tests applied under GATT Article XX, 23 the complaining
parties (the United States, Canada and Argentina) bear the burden of
proving that the EC "failed to ensure in the regulatory process that its
measure[s are] the least restrictive of trade. 2 4 This suggests that under
the TBT Agreement, the complaining parties will have difficulty disput-
215ing that the EC regulations are not least-restrictive. Furthermore, it is
possible that because the mandatory EC scheme covers only one issue,
an Appellate Body will find that that benefits of informing consumers
outweigh the incidental effects on international trade. 16 Nonetheless, the
213. See infra Part. VI.E.
214. Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on International Regulations,
in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 283, 309-10 (Grd.inee de
Biirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (emphasis omitted).
215. See id. at 314 (noting that because "the [TBT] Agreement does not set up a general
presumption against such regulations as trade barriers ... [the provisions of the TBT
Agreement must, then, not be interpreted so broadly as to nullify or fundamentally frustrate
the core right to regulate as recognized in the Preamble.").
216. See APPLETON, supra note 40, at 115.
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compulsory nature of the regulations combined with existence of eco-
labeling schemes addressing other environmental concerns. 7 necessarily
means that there are less-restrictive means available.
This analysis does not imply that not all mandatory regulations will
comply with the TBT Agreement. If a sufficient number of consumers
fear for their health, they will demand non-GM goods, supporting a vol-
untary labeling regime."8 Thus, there is little need for a mandatory
regulatory regime where a voluntary program is less-restrictive and can
accomplish the EC's goals of risk minimization. Additionally, voluntary
labeling programs encounter less obstacles under the TBT Agreement,
making it easier to adhere to the Agreement's requirements.
E. Applying the GAT
Assuming arguendo that a Panel concludes that the TBT and SPS
Agreements govern the EC labeling program, the program must also
survive scrutiny under GATT 1994.2'9 This possibility arises if the Panel
decides that the scope of either agreement does not cover non-product-
related PPM-based eco-labels. While the TBT Agreement and GATT
overlap in some areas, GATT Article XX provides members with excep-
tions to their GAT[ obligations. Before considering these exceptions,
this Note will examine the basic obligations under GATT Article I and
III.
1. Basic GATT Obligations
a. Most Favoured Nation Obligation
Article 1: 1 describes the MFN obligation, requiring that trade privi-
leges extended by one member be available to all members.220 As applied
to mandatory eco-labeling programs, this requires members to apply la-
beling requirements equally to products from all member nations.
Compliance with this obligation requires a "like products" analysis. Due
to lack of empirical data, it is impossible to assess whether the EC regu-
lations comply with this obligation.22' The regulations appear structurally
217. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 2, at 43-
68.
218. Traceability concerns may pose a problem for such a voluntary program. See infra
Part. VII.
219. Scott, supra note 79, at 229-30 (noting the possibility that the Appellate Body will
concurrently apply GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement and that "a measure which is found to
be lawful under the TBT Agreement would not automatically enjoy a 'safe haven' from scru-
tiny under GAT"').
220. GAlr 1947, supra note 18, art. 1(1), 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98.
221. See also supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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to comport with the MFN obligation, but administrative practice might
show illegal discrimination.
b. National Treatment Provision and
"Like Products" Analysis
The national treatment provisions of Article III require that members
do not use internal policy tools to protect domestic products.222 As with
the analogous provision in the TBT Agreement, enforcement of the pro-
vision focuses on a "like products" analysis.223 While the PPM-based
coverage of the TBT Agreement is uncertain, the general language of
GATT and subsequent Panel decisions make it clear that GATT covers
both product and non-product related PPMs.
Regarding PPM-based regulations, the Panel's report in United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna F"), discussing manda-
tory government regulations, states that a member cannot use production
methods unrelated to the product's characteristics to justify discrimina-
tion.24 In Tuna I, the Panel found that mandatory eco-labeling programs
employing criteria based on non-product-related PPMs violate GATT.
225
As a result, the EC could not argue that GM products are not like prod-
ucts because of any non-product-related PPM, but it could still support
its regulations by referring to product-related PPMs. Additionally, the
EC will argue that the products are not directly substitutable. The effi-
cacy of this argument depends on whether the regulations have a
226protective purpose. 6 As noted earlier, because their recent enactment,
the protective nature of the regulations is unclear.
Possibility supporting an EC argument that GM and non-GM prod-
ucts are not like products is Asbestos, where the Appellate Body adopted
the use of four criteria to analyze product "likeness":
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-
uses of the products; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits-more
comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions and behav-
iour-in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification
of the products.227
222. GATI' 1947, supra note 18, art. 111(1), 55 U.N.T.S. at 204.
223. Id. art. II1(4), 55 U.N.T.S. at 206.
224. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594,
5.14 (1991) (not adopted); Okubo, supra note 35, at 618.
225. See Bartenhagen, supra note 109, at 66.
226. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
227. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WrTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, 85.
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In Asbestos, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings that
the disputed asbestos products were "like products," stressing that the
Panel "should have examined the evidence related to each of [the] four
criteria and, then, weighed all of that evidence, along with any other
relevant evidence, in making an overall determination of whether the
products at issue could be characterized as 'like.' ,21' Furthermore, a de-
termination of "likeness" focuses on "the nature and extent of a
competitive relationship between and among products. 229
The Appellate Body finding of unlikeness rested on a finding of con-
sumer tastes and habits associated with the health risks of asbestos.230
While an Appellate Body might similarly focus on consumer perceptions
to the risks posed by GMOs, these perceptions deserve minimal weight.
In Asbestos, the health risks that undoubtedly influenced consumer tastes
were verifiable. The Appellate Body noted that "consumers' tastes and
habits.., are very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with a
product which is known to be highly carcinogenic.,231 Within the context
of GMOs, there is no basis for providing heavy weight to speculative
fears, even with growing evidence of risks. Thus, this minimizes the
relative importance of the consumer tastes criterion. However, even if
consumer preferences result from irrational beliefs, these beliefs will
affect a determination of whether there is a competitive relationship be-
tween GM and non-GM products, an critical element in a finding of
likeness. Nonetheless, following Asbestos, a "like products" analysis
requires a consideration of all four criteria and all available evidence and
does not require elevating consumer preferences above the other factors.
2. General Exceptions to GATT Obligations
Despite the broad proscriptions against discrimination, GATT pro-
vides a vehicle for members to escape their obligations in limited
circumstances. Therefore, if the EC is engaging in discrimination, it
must seek refuge under these exceptions. GATT Article XX, provides, in
pertinent part:
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination between countries where the same
228. Id. 109 (emphasis in original). According to the Appellate Body, the Panel's find-
ing of "likeness" did not properly consider three of the four criteria; in fact, the Panel only
considered the first criterion in its "likeness" determination. Id.
229. Id. T 99.
230. Id. T 121.
231. See id. (emphasis added).
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conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any [member] of measures:
I.
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
232
As shown earlier, the TBT Agreement contains nearly identical lan-
guage which conditions a member's ability to impose non-tariff trade
barriers.233 Similarly, the EC regulations fail to fit under this exception.
The key operative language of the environmental exceptions is the
term "necessary," which is not defined anywhere in the treaty. However,
Panels and Appellate Bodies narrowly interpret this term, making it dif-
ficult for a country to utilize this exception. In Asbestos, the Appellate
Body quoted an earlier Panel decision in Thailand-Restrictions on Im-
portation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes which concluded the
measure at issue is "'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b) only if there
were no alternative measure consistent with [GATFF], or less inconsistent
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to
achieve its health policy objectives."23 Furthermore, in Tuna I, the Panel
narrowly interpreted the term "necessary" to require least-restrictive
measures before a country can seek protection under Article XX(b). 235
In determining whether there is a less restrictive measure available
which the member could reasonably be expected to employ, the Appel-
late Body employs a balancing test.236 Among other things, this
balancing test includes:
232. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. XX:I(b), 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article XX(g) pro-
vides an exception for measure "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." Id. art. XX(g), 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. This section will not be discussed in this
note due to its tenuous relationship with the EC regulations.
233. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
234. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/DS 135/AB/R, 170 (quoting Thailand-Restrictions
on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of the Panel, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT
B.I.S.D (37th Supp.) at 200, 75 (1991).
235. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594,
5.27-28 (1991) (not adopted).
236. Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO
Docs. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DSI69/AB/R, 164 (Dec. 11, 2000); Asbestos, supra note 234,
$ 172.
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[Taking] into account the relative importance of the common in-
terest or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is
intended to protect. The more vital or important those common
interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as "neces-
sary" a measure as an enforcement instrument.237
This balancing test appears to open the door for the EC to use the
GATT Article XX(b) exception to justify their regulations.
The Appellate Body in Asbestos concluded that the disputed measure
protected the vital interest of "the preservation of human life and health
through the elimination, or reduction of the well-known, and life-
threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres.,231 Completing the
balancing test, the Appellate Body concluded that France could not be
expected to employ any alternative measure to achieve its desired level
of protection, that of halting asbestos risk.2 9 France justified its protec-
tive measure by choosing a zero-tolerance level of protection for a vital
interest.
In contrast, the EC regulations do not target a well-defined risk and
do not provide for a complete ban against the GM products. Indeed, the
nature of the authorization process contemplates that at least some GM
products will enter the EC. Furthermore, the exceptions embodied in
GATT Article XX(b) (and elsewhere in Article XX) do not extend to
regulations seeking consumer protections.24 Once again, the breadth of
the EC regulations raise doubts as to their validity.
Overall, the "alternative measure" test marginalizes the use of this
exception when considering the legality of mandatory labeling programs
under GATT.24' As shown with the analysis of the TBT Agreement
above, there is will usually be a less restrictive method for accomplish-
ing the goals of labeling programs. Additionally, under GATT Article
XX, the burden of proving least restrictive means falls with the member
employing the regulation, rather than the complaining party because the
regulation is presumptively discriminatory in violation of GATT Article
111.42 The mandatory character of the EC program ensures accomplish-
ment of the regulation's purported objectives. However, as shown below,
237. Korea Beef, supra note 236, 162. The Appellate Body subsequently adopted this
balancing test when analyzing "necessary" under Article XX(b) in Asbestos. Asbestos, supra
note 234, [ 172, 175.
238. Asbestos, supra note 234, 172 (emphasis added).
239. Id. 7 174.
240. Scott, supra note 79, at 230.
241. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37, 48.
242. See Howse & Tuerk, supra note 214, at 314.
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it is possible to have a voluntary program that protects human health and
the environment.
In the event the Appellate Body considers the EC regulations "nec-
essary," the regulations must still comply with the requirements in the
chapeau to Article XX. Any measures applied under the exceptions must
not be applied as "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or [as] a disguised
restriction on international trade. 2 43 The effect of these requirements is
to prevent abuse of the Article XX exceptions.
Regulations unjustifiably discriminate when there is a coercive effect
on the policy decisions of foreign governments.245 Thus, the requirements
of the chapeau focus on the application of the measure. For example, in
United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, the Panel found that United States' regulations prohibiting the
importation of shrimp caught using a certain type of netting had the ef-
fect of forcing other members to adopt the same policies.246 Because of
the uncertain application of the regulations, it is unclear whether the EC
regulations comport with the chapeau.
Analysis of the EC regulations illustrates numerous issues that ques-
tion the validity of them. Regardless of which annexed agreement a
Panel or Appellate Body applies to the regulations, they will not survive
a WTO challenge. The possibility of implementing a voluntary labeling
regime precludes the possibility of a workable government labeling
regulation.
VII. A WTO-FRIENDLY EcO-LABELING SCHEME
Despite the obstacles analyzed above, it is possible to develop a
GMO labeling scheme compatible with the WTO agreements. Once es-
tablished, the labeling system will convey information to consumers who
can adjust their purchases accordingly. Such a system can fulfill the EC's
goals of protecting human and animal health, the environment and con-
sumer interests through the labeling of GM products.
The first fundamental characteristic of a trade-friendly labeling
regime is that the regime be voluntary and free from government
involvement. For example, a non-governmental organization can
243. GATT 1947, supra note 18, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration mirrors this idea. Rio Declaration, supra note 46, princ. 12.
244. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1173
(2d ed. 2002).
245. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Oct. 12,
1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 161.
246. Id.
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authorize the placement of a unique label that identifies a product as
GMO-free. Such a program differs from the EC regulations by indicating
the absence of GMOs rather than the existence of GMOs. The lack of
government involvement immediately places the labeling program on
easier footing under the WTO agreements. The labeling system would
then be a "standard" rather than "technical regulation" under the TBT
Agreement.
As a standard, the program would encounter different, less rigorous
obligations under the TBT Agreement. Because it is a multilateral
treaty binding state-parties, the TBT Agreement's applicability to pri-
vate entities is questionable. Nevertheless, Article 4.1 requires
members to "take such reasonable measures as may be available to
them to ensure that ... non-governmental standardizing bodies within
their territories ... accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice
["Code"]. 24 '7 Thus, compliance with the Code is optional and is de-
pendent on pressure from central governmental bodies. Regardless of
where the standardizing body is located, one can assume that the EC
can assert sufficient economic pressure to coerce the body into comply-
ing with the Code. Substantively, the Code sets forth several
requirements, many of which mirror those for technical regulations. In
any event, the nature of an independent voluntary labeling scheme for
GMOs minimizes the possibility for international trade disputes.
A voluntary program falls outside the scope of the SPS Agreement
as there is no governmental SPS measure. Generally, the provisions of
these treaties, including GATT, should not be binding on private actors.
Additionally, administration by a private entity will make it increas-
ingly difficult for a single nation, or bloc of nations to unilaterally
impose their environmental laws on foreign nations.
To handle concerns about the effectiveness of a non-government
run program, regular audits are necessary. Furthermore, individual
countries could prevent program abuse by applying truth-in-advertising
legislation to labeling claims.
Even though by definition a private sponsored voluntary scheme
indicates a lack of government involvement, governments will likely be
able to have some measure of influence in the development and ad-
ministration of the scheme. In this case, such a labeling scheme will
deviate from the ideal of zero government involvement. However, the
international arena in which the labeling regime will operate should
prevent a single country from excessively exerting its influence. None-
theless, even if the labeling scheme is a government-sponsored
247. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4.1, at 22054.
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voluntary scheme, the less obtrusive nature of the voluntary program
minimizes the possibility that it will violate WTO provisions.
A correlative requirement of a voluntary scheme is increased trans-
parency, during both the development and the administration of the
program. The CTE recognizes that "[i]ncreased transparency can help
deal with trade concerns regarding eco-labelling schemes/programmes
while it can also help to meet environmental objectives by providing
accurate and comprehensive information to consumers. 24 The TBT
Agreement's Code of Good Practice already contains provisions on
transparency, providing for notice, consultation and participation from
interested parties during the criteria setting and drafting of standards.2 9
As a result, a WTO-consistent labeling program should be able to in-
corporate the concerns and differences associated with producers
located in a variety of countries with different capabilities.2 °
The standardizing body should draft the authorization procedure so
that any producer in any nation can easily apply for a label. Thus, the
procedure should not be unduly burdensome and impose unnecessary
costs when a producer attempts to verify that their product is GM-free.
To this end, the TBT Agreement requires members to grant technical
2511assistance and preferential treatment towards developing countries.
A global GM labeling system reduces the burden on producers by
creating a single GM label.2"2 Negative-content labeling schemes might
subject manufacturers to different authorization procedures in different
countries, wasting resources. In contrast, a single positive-content
scheme indicating the absence of GMOs is more economically effi-
cient.
For the labeling scheme to be effective, the standardizing organiza-
tion needs to increase consumer knowledge of the label. Consumers
must be able to identify easily the label or symbol awarded to the prod-
uct while also understanding the purpose of the label. Therefore,
combining the authorization process with an educational marketing
program will fulfill the EC's goals of increasing consumer awareness
to protect human health and safety.
A possible downside to a voluntary content-positive scheme is the
difficulty of addressing the EC's concerns with traceability and the
subsequent removal of GMOs deemed harmful to the environment. In a
voluntary system, effective traceability depends upon the rapid growth
248. CTE Report, supra note 56, 184.
249. See generally TBT Agreement, supra note 17.
250. See Etsy, supra note 45, at 1286.
251. TBT Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 11-12, at 22061-62.
252. See Damien Geradin, A Lawyer's View, in TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 62, at 91, 94.
Spring 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
of a market for goods designated as GM-free. Under this scenario, a
growing market for GM-free food products would shrink the market for
foods containing GMOs, ideally eliminating the GM market altogether.
While this development likely appeals to opponents of GMOs, it is
unlikely to happen quickly enough, if ever. Thus, traceability concerns
will remain with any non-labeled goods. However, setting a high
standard for indicating the presence of GMOs (stricter than the .9% de
minimis exception in the EC regulations), combined with market
demand for labeled products will diminish the potential negative
effects that GM products may pose for society.
Nonetheless, because a voluntary scheme would award labels on
products that are "GM free," it is difficult to ensure the integrity of the
label without mandatory regulations governing traceability. This prob-
lem arises when a manufacturer wishes to place a food product on the
market that consists of dozens of ingredients. Unless the manufacturer
can exert sufficient downward pressure on its suppliers, the manufac-
turer will lack the ability to apply for a "GM free" label. This does not,
however, require the imposition of mandatory labels. The EC can ad-
dress traceability concerns by implementing chain-of-custody
requirements during the food manufacturing process.253 Such regula-
tions would be separate from the labeling regime and can protect the
integrity of the label. While these complementary systems might ad-
dress traceability concerns, the level of government involvement might
bring rise to further WTO disputes.
CONCLUSIONS
The debate over the labeling of GMOs is a logical extension of the
increased visibility of the modem environmental movement. Uncer-
tainty over the long term effects of GMOs provides a justifiable
rationale for measures designed to increase consumer awareness to the
presence of GMOs. However, the WTO inextricably influences the
formation, development and legality of such measures. Nonetheless, it
is possible to protect consumers from unintentionally purchasing prod-
ucts containing GMOs without resorting to unilateral regulations that
conflict with the WTO's goal of reducing barriers to trade. Voluntary,
privately run labeling programs provide a mechanism for protecting the
environment while comporting with WTO trade rules. If consumers
253. See, e.g., Smartwood, Chain-of-Custody Certification Guidelines and Standards
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.smartwood.org/guidelines/coc-guidelines-standards.doc
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (providing chain-of-custody requirements before wood products can
be certified by the Forest Stewardship Council).
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fear GM-products, they will increase purchase of these voluntarily la-
beled products, reducing the market share of products produced from
or containing GMOs, validating the theory of green consumerism.
